Post by arfankj4 on Mar 5, 2024 6:27:28 GMT 2
To the extent that such an objective reflects the mixed normative reasoning behind prevailing policies this model may offer a useful approach to a positive optimal tax theory. Paper Information Profits and Economic Development by Dan Schwab and Eric Werker Without development there is no profit without profit no development wrote economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter in his landmark book The Theory of Economic Development.
A open question however has been whether excess profits—known as rents—are good for development. Economic theory thus far supports both sides of the argument yielding conflicting advice for competition policy and anticorruption efforts. This paper examines the question by analyzing a comprehensive industry—level dataset of manufacturing Poland Mobile Number List sectors—and by applying methods of the competition and growth scholarship of economist Philippe Aghion and colleagues. This approach allows the analysis of industry level profitability as opposed to individual firms and the overall growth of the economy. Evidence suggests that rents as measured by a high markup that is also an indication of low competition seem to slow growth in productivity or output.
The effect is strongest in poor countries. Higher rents are associated with a slower removal of tariffs implying that firms rent seek to prevent competition and maintain their high margins. be in lieu of investment in innovation or new productive assets which slows the overall growth of the sector. Furthermore in industries in which high profits should be essential in generating growth those sectors that would otherwise need external finance but in a country with weak financial markets the negative impact of rents on growth is especially strong. Findings also show that countries with more rents in the manufacturing sector grow slower even when other controls are introduced. Key concepts include What may be good for the players in one industry may not be good for the economy at large.
A open question however has been whether excess profits—known as rents—are good for development. Economic theory thus far supports both sides of the argument yielding conflicting advice for competition policy and anticorruption efforts. This paper examines the question by analyzing a comprehensive industry—level dataset of manufacturing Poland Mobile Number List sectors—and by applying methods of the competition and growth scholarship of economist Philippe Aghion and colleagues. This approach allows the analysis of industry level profitability as opposed to individual firms and the overall growth of the economy. Evidence suggests that rents as measured by a high markup that is also an indication of low competition seem to slow growth in productivity or output.
The effect is strongest in poor countries. Higher rents are associated with a slower removal of tariffs implying that firms rent seek to prevent competition and maintain their high margins. be in lieu of investment in innovation or new productive assets which slows the overall growth of the sector. Furthermore in industries in which high profits should be essential in generating growth those sectors that would otherwise need external finance but in a country with weak financial markets the negative impact of rents on growth is especially strong. Findings also show that countries with more rents in the manufacturing sector grow slower even when other controls are introduced. Key concepts include What may be good for the players in one industry may not be good for the economy at large.
